Owuamalam, Weerabangsa, Karunagharan and Rubin found that Malaysians associate people in low status groups with anger more than their higher status counterparts: the hunchback heuristic. But is this belief accurate? Here, we propose the alternative possibility that members of low-status groups might deliberately suppress anger to counter this stigma, while members of high-status groups might disinhibit their anger to assert their superiority. To test these propositions, we manipulated undergraduate students' relative group status by leading them to believe that provocative comments about their undergraduate social identity came from a professor (low-status condition) or a junior foundation year student (high-status condition). Using eye-tracking, we then measured their gaze durations on the comments, which we used as a physiological signal of anger: dwelling (Experiment 1). Results revealed that dwelling was significantly greater in the high-status condition than in the low-status condition. Experiment 2 conceptually replicated this pattern using a self-report method and found that the suppression-disinhibition effect occurred only when reputational concerns were strong.
Compassionate feelings for people who are victimized because of their perceived sexual deviance (e.g., gay men) may be incompatible with support for heterosexual norms among heterosexual men. But, indifference (or passivity) toward such victims could raise concern over heterosexual men's gay-tolerance attitude. Two classic social psychological theories offer competing explanations on when heterosexual men might be passive or compassionate toward gay victims of hate crime. The bystander model proposes passivity toward victims in an emergency situation if other bystanders are similarly passive, but compassionate reactions if bystanders are responsive to the victims. Conversely, the social loafing model proposes compassionate reactions toward victims when bystanders are passive, but passivity when other bystanders are already responsive toward the victims' predicament. We tested and found supportive evidence for both models across two experiments (Ntotal = 501) in which passivity and compassionate reactions to gay victims of a purported hate crime were recorded after heterosexual men's concern for social evaluation was either accentuated or relaxed. We found that the bystander explanation was visible only when the potential for social evaluation was strong, while the social loafing account occurred only when the potential for social evaluation was relaxed. Hence, we unite both models by showing that the bystander explanation prevails in situations where cues to social evaluation are strong, whereas the social loafing effect operates when concern over social judgement is somewhat muted.
Do superordinate in-group bias as well as temporal and social comparisons offer standalone explanations for system justification? We addressed this question using the latest World Value Survey (7th Wave), combining the responses of 55,721 participants from 40 different nations. Results from a random slope multilevel model showed that superordinate (national) identification, temporal comparison (i.e., the outcomes of an individual relative to those of his/her parents at different time points), and social comparison (based on income levels) were independent and positive predictors of system justification. Specifically, system justification increased when national identification was high, when income increased (i.e., the socioeconomic comparison was positive), and when the outcomes of citizens improved relative to the outcomes of their parents at relevant time points (i.e., the temporal comparison was positive). Incidentally, we also observed an interaction between national identification and temporal comparison (but not with social comparison), indicating that positive temporal comparison seemed to have a reduced effect (but still significant) for highly identified citizens. These results are supportive of the social identity approach to system justification and suggest that support for societal systems is a positive function of people's personal and group interests.
Do the disadvantaged have an autonomous system justification motivation that operates against their personal and group interests? System justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994, Br. J. Soc. Psychol, 33, 1) proposes that they do and that this motivation helps to (1) reduce cognitive dissonance and associated uncertainties and (2) soothe the pain that is associated with knowing that one's group is subject to social inequality. However, 25 years of research on this system justification motivation has given rise to several theoretical and empirical inconsistencies. The present article argues that these inconsistencies can be resolved by a social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA; Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2018, Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci, 27, 91). SIMSA assumes that instances of system justification are often in alignment with (rather than opposed to) the interests of the disadvantaged. According to SIMSA, the disadvantaged may support social systems (1) in order to acknowledge social reality, (2) when they perceive the wider social system to constitute a superordinate ingroup, and (3) because they hope to improve their ingroup's status through existing channels in the long run. These propositions are corroborated by existing and emerging evidence. We conclude that SIMSA offers a more coherent and parsimonious explanation for system justification than does SJT.
The debate between the proponents of SIMSA and SJT does not pivot on whether system justification occurs - we all agree that system justification does occur. The issue is why it occurs? System justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1) assumes that system justification is motivated by a special system justification motive. In contrast, the social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA; Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, , Current Directions in Psychological Science, 27, 2) argues that there is insufficient conclusive evidence for this special system motive, and that system justification can be explained in terms of social identity motives, including the motivation to accurately reflect social reality and the search for a positive social identity. Here, we respond to criticisms of SIMSA, including criticisms of its social reality, ingroup bias, and hope for future ingroup status explanations of system justification. We conclude that SJT theorists should decide whether system justification is oppositional to, or compatible with social identity motives, and that this dilemma could be resolved by relinquishing the theoretically problematic notion of a system justification motivation.
We investigated the impact of egalitarianism on consumers' inclination to support fair-trade products and examined whether this effect was observed among individuals with different political affiliations. In four experiments featuring a fictional chocolate brand presented in either a social-justice (fair trade) or quality-focused (control) manner, we examined the product purchase intentions of both left- and right-leaning consumers in the United States and Malaysia (Studies 1a, N = 200; 1b, N = 269; & 2, N = 410). Results revealed that participants expressed a greater willingness to support the product when it was framed as contributing to a social justice cause, but this effect was limited to left- and right-leaning consumers who strongly endorsed egalitarian principles. Study 3 (N = 354) employed a mediated-moderation approach and confirmed that an elevated sensitivity to injustice was the underlying mechanism driving increased intentions to support the product among egalitarians exposed to social justice framing. These results demonstrate that right-leaning consumers can be influenced by social justice framing when their commitment to equity is strong.
The relationships between subjective status and perceived legitimacy are important for understanding the extent to which people with low status are complicit in their oppression. We use novel data from 66 samples and 30 countries (N = 12,788) and find that people with higher status see the social system as more legitimate than those with lower status, but there is variation across people and countries. The association between subjective status and perceived legitimacy was never negative at any levels of eight moderator variables, although the positive association was sometimes reduced. Although not always consistent with hypotheses, group identification, self-esteem, and beliefs in social mobility were all associated with perceived legitimacy among people who have low subjective status. These findings enrich our understanding of the relationship between social status and legitimacy.