Although relatively little is known about ethnic differences in men's drive for muscularity, recent theoretical developments suggest that ethnic minority men may desire greater muscularity to contest their positions of relative subordinate masculinity. This study tested this hypothesis in a sample of 185 White, 180 Black British, and 182 South Asian British men. Participants completed self-report measures of drive for muscularity, need for power, adherence to traditional cultural values, and ethnic group affiliation. Taking into account between-group differences in body mass index, results indicated that White men had significantly lower drive for muscularity than Black and South Asian men, who were not significantly different from each other. In addition, greater need for power was significantly associated with higher drive for muscularity in ethnic minority, but not White, men. Greater adherence to traditional cultural values, but not ethnic group affiliation, was associated with lower drive for muscularity in all ethnic groups. These results suggest that ethnic minority men may desire greater muscularity as a means of negotiating masculinity and attendant ideals of appearance.
We tested Apperly and Butterfill's (2009, Psychological Review, 116, 753) theory that humans have two mindreading systems whereby the efficient-system guiding anticipatory glances displays signature limits that do not apply to the flexible system guiding verbal predictions. Experiments 1 and 2 tested urban Mainland-Chinese adults (n = 64) and Experiment 3 tested Semai children living in the rainforests of Peninsular Malaysia (3- to 4-year-olds, n = 60). Participants - across different ages, groups and methods - anticipated others' false-beliefs about object-location but not object-identity. Convergence in signature limits signalled that the early-developing efficient system involved minimal theory-of-mind. Chinese adults and older Semai children showed flexibility in their direct predictions. The flexible mindreading system in ascribing others' beliefs as such was task-sensitive and implicated maturational and cultural contributions.
Previous studies have reported equivocal findings concerning the impact of wearing a hijab, or Islamic head- and body-cover, on Muslim women's body image. Here, we sought to examine that impact using a larger sample of Muslim women than has been relied upon and a wider range of body image measures. A total of 587 British Muslim women completed a battery of scales assessing their frequency and conservativeness of hijab use, body image variables, attitudes towards the media and beauty ideals, importance of appearance, and religiosity. Preliminary results indicated that 218 women never used the hijab and 369 women used some form of the hijab at least rarely. Controlling for religiosity, women who wore the hijab had more positive body image, lower internalization of media messages about beauty standards, and placed less importance on appearance than women who did not wear the hijab. Among women who wore the hijab, hijab use significantly predicted weight discrepancy and body appreciation over and above religiosity. These results are discussed in terms of the possible protective impact among British Muslim women of wearing the hijab.
This article examines the implications of perceived negativity from members of a dominant outgroup on the world views and perceived relative group worth of members of disadvantaged groups. We hypothesized that concerns about the negative opinions a dominant outgroup is perceived to hold of the ingroup (i.e., meta-stereotypes) would undermine group members' views about societal fairness. We expected this trend to be mediated by recall of previous personal experiences of discrimination. We further hypothesized that members' views about societal fairness would predict their perception of the ingroup's worth relative to the outgroup - such that undermined views about societal fairness would be associated with lower perceived ingroup worth relative to the outgroup. Taken jointly, results from two studies using two real intergroup contexts support these hypotheses and are discussed in terms of their implications for the social mobility of members of disadvantaged groups.
This study examines the structure of self-estimates of intelligence (SEI) across 12 nations (Australia, Austria, Brazil, France, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, UK and US). Participants rated themselves on general and specific abilities from three popular models of intelligence: Gardner's multiple intelligences, Sternberg's triarchic theory of intelligence, and Goleman's emotional intelligence. The results showed that (a) laypeople across nations have similar and invariant concepts of intelligence, (b) concepts of intelligence are cross-culturally closely related to academic notions of intellectual ability and (c) sex differences in general and specific SEI favouring men are consistent across countries. Male hubris and female humility in SEI seem independent of sex differences in actual cognitive ability and national levels of masculinity-femininity. Furthermore, international mean differences in general SEI could not be attributed to discrepancies in national intelligence quotient (IQ) levels or to cultural variations.
Two studies investigated (1) how people react to research describing a sex difference, depending on whether that difference favours males or females, and (2) how accurately people can predict how the average man and woman will react. In Study 1, Western participants (N = 492) viewed a fictional popular-science article describing either a male-favouring or a female-favouring sex difference (i.e., men/women draw better; women/men lie more). Both sexes reacted less positively to the male-favouring differences, judging the findings to be less important, less credible, and more offensive, harmful, and upsetting. Participants predicted that the average man and woman would react more positively to sex differences favouring their own sex. This was true of the average woman, although the level of own-sex favouritism was lower than participants predicted. It was not true, however, of the average man, who - like the average woman - reacted more positively to the female-favouring differences. Study 2 replicated these findings in a Southeast Asian sample (N = 336). Our results are consistent with the idea that both sexes are more protective of women than men, but that both exaggerate the level of same-sex favouritism within each sex - a misconception that could potentially harm relations between the sexes.
This manuscript reviews the extant literature on key issues related to mobile gambling and considers whether the potential risks of harm emerging from this platform are driven by pre-existing comorbidities or by psychological processes unique to mobile gambling. We propose an account based on associative learning that suggests this form of gambling is likely to show distinctive features compared with other gambling technologies. Smartphones are a rapidly growing platform on which individuals can gamble using specifically designed applications, adapted websites or text messaging. This review considers how mobile phone use interacts with psychological processes relevant to gambling, the games users are likely to play on smartphones, and the interactions afforded by smartphones. Our interpretation of the evidence is that the schedules of reinforcement found in gambling interact with the ways in which people tend to use smartphones that may expedite the acquisition of maladaptive learned behaviours such as problem gambling. This account is consistent with existing theories and frameworks of problem gambling and has relevance to other forms of mobile phone use.
We used an identities approach to examine voting intentions in the June 2016 UK referendum on membership of the European Union (EU). In April 2016, 303 British adults (58.7% women, age M = 34.73) indicated their voting intentions for the referendum and completed measures of identification with the national in-group, perceived threat from Muslim immigrants, belief in Islamophobic conspiracy narratives, Islamophobia, general conspiracist beliefs, ambiguity tolerance, and belief in a clash of civilizations. Path and mediation analyses indicated that greater belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories mediated the link between Islamophobia and intention to vote to leave. Islamophobia and Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs also mediated the effects of perceived threat from Muslims on voting intentions. Other variables acted as antecedents of perceived threat or Islamophobic conspiracy narratives. These findings highlight the role that identity-based cognitions may have played in shaping voting intentions for the UK EU referendum.
Previous cross-cultural eye-tracking studies examining face recognition discovered differences in the eye movement strategies that observers employ when perceiving faces. However, it is unclear (1) the degree to which this effect is fundamentally related to culture and (2) to what extent facial physiognomy can account for the differences in looking strategies when scanning own- and other-race faces. In the current study, Malay, Chinese and Indian young adults who live in the same multiracial country performed a modified yes/no recognition task. Participants' recognition accuracy and eye movements were recorded while viewing muted face videos of own- and other-race individuals. Behavioural results revealed a clear own-race advantage in recognition memory, and eye-tracking results showed that the three ethnic race groups adopted dissimilar fixation patterns when perceiving faces. Chinese participants preferentially attended more to the eyes than Indian participants did, while Indian participants made more and longer fixations on the nose than Malay participants did. In addition, we detected statistically significant, though subtle, differences in fixation patterns between the faces of the three races. These findings suggest that the racial differences in face-scanning patterns may be attributed both to culture and to variations in facial physiognomy between races.