OBJECTIVE: To explore tobacco industry accounts of its use of indirect tobacco advertising and trademark diversification (TMD) in Malaysia, a nation with a reputation for having an abundance of such advertising.
METHODS: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private tobacco industry internal documents made available through the Master Settlement Agreement.
RESULTS: 132 documents relevant to the topic were reviewed. TMD efforts were created to advertise cigarettes after advertising restrictions on direct advertising were imposed in 1982. To build public credibility the tobacco companies set up small companies and projected them as entities independent of tobacco. Each brand selected an activity or event such as music, travel, fashion, and sports that best suited its image. RJ Reynolds sponsored music events to advertise its Salem brand while Philip Morris used Marlboro World of Sports since advertising restrictions prevented the use of the Marlboro man in broadcast media. Despite a ban on tobacco advertisements in the mass media, tobacco companies were the top advertisers in the country throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The media's dependence on advertising revenue and support from the ruling elite played a part in delaying efforts to ban indirect advertising.
CONCLUSION: Advertising is crucial for the tobacco industry. When faced with an advertising ban they created ways to circumvent it, such as TMDs.
OBJECTIVE: To review tobacco company strategies of using youth smoking prevention programmes to counteract the Malaysian government's tobacco control legislation and efforts in conducting research on youth to market to them.
METHODS: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private internal industry documents. Search terms included Malay, cmtm, jaycees, YAS, and direct marketing; 195 relevant documents were identified for this paper.
RESULTS: Industry internal documents reveal that youth anti-smoking programmes were launched to offset the government's tobacco control legislation. The programme was seen as a strategy to lobby key politicians and bureaucrats for support in preventing the passage of legislation. However, the industry continued to conduct research on youth, targeted them in marketing, and considered the teenage market vital for its survival. Promotional activities targeting youth were also carried out such as sports, notably football and motor racing, and entertainment events and cash prizes. Small, affordable packs of cigarettes were crucial to reach new smokers.
CONCLUSION: The tobacco industry in Malaysia engaged in duplicitous conduct in regard to youth. By buying into the youth smoking issue it sought to move higher on the moral playing field and strengthen its relationship with government, while at the same time continuing to market to youth. There is no evidence that industry youth smoking prevention programmes were effective in reducing smoking; however, they were effective in diluting the government's tobacco control legislation.
To review how tobacco transnational companies conducted their business in the hostile environment of Singapore, attempting to counter some of the government's tobacco control measures; to compare the Malaysian and the Singaporean governments' stance on tobacco control and the direct bearing of this on the way the tobacco companies conduct their business.
OBJECTIVE: To describe tobacco industry efforts in Malaysia to thwart government efforts to regulate tobacco promotion and health warnings.
METHODS: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private tobacco industry internal documents made available through the Master Settlement Agreement and secondary websites; relevant information from news articles and financial reports.
RESULTS: Commencing in the 1970s, the industry began to systematically thwart government tobacco control. Guidelines were successfully promoted in the place of legislation for over two decades. Even when the government succeeded in implementing regulations such as health warnings and advertising bans they were compromised and acted effectively to retard further progress for years to come.
CONCLUSION: Counter-measures to delay or thwart government efforts to regulate tobacco were initiated by the industry. Though not unique to Malaysia, the main difference lies in the degree to which strategies were used to successfully counter stringent tobacco control measures between 1970 and 1995.
A survey of lettuce sold in Penang markets showed them to be heavily contaminated with faecal coliforms and nearly half the samples were positive for Salmonella or Shigella. The use of night soil on these vegetables is a likely cause of gastroenteritis.
STUDY OBJECTIVE: To review the tobacco industry's Asian environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) consultants programme, focusing on three key nations: China, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.
METHODS: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private internal industry documents.
MAIN RESULTS: The release of the 1986 US Surgeon General's report on second hand smoke provoked tobacco companies to prepare for a major threat to their industry. Asian programme activities included conducting national/international symposiums, consultant "road shows" and extensive lobbying and media activities. The industry exploited confounding factors said to be unique to Asian societies such as diet, culture and urban pollution to downplay the health risks of ETS. The industry consultants were said to be "..prepared to do the kinds of things they were recruited to do".
CONCLUSIONS: The programme was successful in blurring the science on ETS and keeping the controversy alive both nationally and internationally. For the duration of the project, it also successfully dissuaded national policy makers from instituting comprehensive bans on smoking in public places.