Continuous outbreaks of the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza A in Asia has resulted in an urgent effort to improve current diagnostics to aid containment of the virus and lower the threat of a influenza pandemic. We report here the development of a PCR-based assay that is highly specific for the H5N1 avian influenza A virus.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/isolation & purification*
Between December 2003 and January 2004 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 infections of poultry were declared in China, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. In 2004 an outbreak was reported in Malaysia. In 2005 H5N1 outbreaks were recorded in poultry in Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, and virus was isolated from swans in Croatia. In 2004 HPAI H5N1 virus was isolated from smuggled eagles detected at the Brussels Airport and in 2005 imported caged birds held in quarantine in England. In 2006 HPAI was reported in poultry in Iraq, India, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Israel in Asia; Albania, France, and Sweden in Europe; and Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger in Africa; as well as in wild birds in some 24 countries across Asia and Europe. In 2003, over 25,000,000 birds were slaughtered because of 241 outbreaks of HPAI caused by virus of H7N7 subtype in the Netherlands. The virus spread into Belgium (eight outbreaks) and Germany (one outbreak). HPAI H5N2 virus was responsible for outbreaks in ostriches in South Africa during 2005. HPAI H7N3 virus was isolated in Pakistan in 2004. Low-pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) H5 or H7 viruses were isolated from poultry in Italy (H7N3 2002-2003; H5N2 2005), The Netherlands (H7N3 2002), France (H5N2 2003), Denmark (H5N7 2003), Taiwan (H5N2 2004), and Japan (H5N2 2005). Many isolations of LPAI viruses of other subtypes were reported from domestic and wild birds. Infections with H9N2 subtype viruses have been widespread across Asia during 2002-06.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/isolation & purification*
The transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus to Southeast Asian countries triggered the first major outbreak and transmission wave in late 2003, accelerating the pandemic threat to the world. Due to the lack of influenza surveillance prior to these outbreaks, the genetic diversity and the transmission pathways of H5N1 viruses from this period remain undefined. To determine the possible source of the wave 1 H5N1 viruses, we recently conducted further sequencing and analysis of samples collected in live-poultry markets from Guangdong, Hunan, and Yunnan in southern China from 2001 to 2004. Phylogenetic analysis of the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of 73 H5N1 isolates from this period revealed a greater genetic diversity in southern China than previously reported. Moreover, results show that eight viruses isolated from Yunnan in 2002 and 2003 were most closely related to the clade 1 virus sublineage from Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia, while two viruses from Hunan in 2002 and 2003 were most closely related to viruses from Indonesia (clade 2.1). Further phylogenetic analyses of the six internal genes showed that all 10 of those viruses maintained similar phylogenetic relationships as the surface genes. The 10 progenitor viruses were genotype Z and shared high similarity (>/=99%) with their corresponding descendant viruses in most gene segments. These results suggest a direct transmission link for H5N1 viruses between Yunnan and Vietnam and also between Hunan and Indonesia during 2002 and 2003. Poultry trade may be responsible for virus introduction to Vietnam, while the transmission route from Hunan to Indonesia remains unclear.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/isolation & purification
Subtype-specific multiplex reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) was developed to simultaneously detect three subtypes (H5, H7 and H9) of avian influenza virus (AIV) type A. The sensitivity of the multiplex RT-PCR was evaluated and compared to that of RT-PCR-enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and conventional RT-PCR. While the sensitivity of the multiplex RT-PCR is as sensitive as the conventional RT-PCR, it is 10 times less sensitive than RT-PCR-ELISA. The multiplex RT-PCR is also as sensitive as the virus isolation method in detecting H9N2 from tracheal samples collected at day 3 and 5 post inoculation. Hence, the developed multiplex RT-PCR assay is a rapid, sensitive and specific assay for detecting of AIV subtypes.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/isolation & purification
Since 2003, highly pathogenic A(H5N1) influenza viruses have been the cause of large-scale death in poultry and the subsequent infection and death of over 140 humans. A group of 55 influenza A(H5N1) viruses isolated from various regions of South East Asia between 2004 and 2006 were tested for their susceptibility to the anti-influenza drugs the neuraminidase inhibitors and adamantanes. The majority of strains were found to be fully sensitive to the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir carboxylate, zanamivir and peramivir; however two strains demonstrated increased IC50 values. Sequence analysis of these strains revealed mutations in the normally highly conserved residues 116 and 117 of the N1 neuraminidase. Sequence analysis of the M2 gene showed that all of the A(H5N1) viruses from Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia contained mutations (L26I and S31N) associated with resistance to the adamantane drugs (rimantadine and amantadine), while strains from Indonesia were found to be a mix of both adamantane resistant (S31N) and sensitive viruses. None of the A(H5N1) viruses from Myanmar contained mutations known to confer adamantane resistance. These results support the use of neuraminidase inhibitors as the most appropriate class of antiviral drug to prevent or treat human A(H5N1) virus infections.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/isolation & purification
Numerous lessons have been learned so far in controlling H5N1 avian influenza in Asia. Early detection of incursions of virus prevented establishment of the disease in several countries, notably Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia. In countries where detection of early cases was delayed, infection is endemic and has been for three or more years. Control measures implemented in these countries need to reflect this finding. Vaccination will continue to be one of the key measures used in these endemically infected countries. Used alone, vaccination will not result in elimination of H5N1 viruses from a country, but, if used correctly, it will markedly reduce the prevalence of and susceptibility to infection. Vaccination has already played a valuable role in reducing the adverse effects of H5N1 viruses. Mass culling also reduces the level of infection in infected areas. However, the long-term benefits are limited in endemically infected countries owing to the high probability of reinfection on restocking unless other measures are used in parallel. Full epidemiological studies have not been conducted in many infected countries. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the number of clinical cases does not truly reflect the levels of infection. Domestic ducks and large live poultry markets have played a key role in the persistence of infection, because they can be infected silently. In tackling this disease, countries should adopt integrated control programs using the combination of measures best suited to the local environment. All surveillance data should be shared, both positive and negative, and should include information on cases of infection and disease. Socioeconomic and ecological implications of all control measures should be assessed before implementation, especially the impact on the rural poor.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/isolation & purification
Malaysia first reported H5N1 poultry case in 2004 and subsequently outbreak in poultry population in 2007. Here, a recombinant gene encoding of peptide epitopes, consisting fragments of HA1, HA2 and a polybasic cleavage site of H5N1 strain Malaysia, was amplified and cloned into pET-47b(+) bacterial expression vector. DNA sequencing and alignment analysis confirmed that the gene had no alteration and in-frame to the vector. Then, His-tagged truncated HA protein was expressed in Escherichia coli BL21 (DE3) under 1 mM IPTG induction. The protein expression was optimized under a time-course induction study and further purified using Ni-NTA agarose under reducing condition. Migration size of protein was detected at 15 kDa by Western blot using anti-His tag monoclonal antibody and demonstrated no discrepancy compared to its calculated molecular weight.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/isolation & purification
The development of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses in poultry in Eurasia accompanied with the increase in human infection in 2006 suggests that the virus has not been effectively contained and that the pandemic threat persists. Updated virological and epidemiological findings from our market surveillance in southern China demonstrate that H5N1 influenza viruses continued to be panzootic in different types of poultry. Genetic and antigenic analyses revealed the emergence and predominance of a previously uncharacterized H5N1 virus sublineage (Fujian-like) in poultry since late 2005. Viruses from this sublineage gradually replaced those multiple regional distinct sublineages and caused recent human infection in China. These viruses have already transmitted to Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand, resulting in a new transmission and outbreak wave in Southeast Asia. Serological studies suggest that H5N1 seroconversion in market poultry is low and that vaccination may have facilitated the selection of the Fujian-like sublineage. The predominance of this virus over a large geographical region within a short period directly challenges current disease control measures.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/isolation & purification