Since the first H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) infection in the region in August 2003, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam have all recorded outbreaks of the disease. The HPAIV continues to occur in some countries in Southeast Asia despite control programmes encompassing surveillance, vaccination and stamping out strategies. A number of strains have been circulating in the region since the first outbreaks in 2003, and although the source of the initial outbreaks in domestic poultry is not known, the continuing propagation of disease in the region is primarily the result of the movement of domestic poultry and poultry products, and people. A comprehensive approach using all the strategies available to break the chain of transmission of the virus in poultry will be needed to achieve lasting disease control.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology*
Avian influenza, an infectious disease of birds, is caused by type A strain of the influenza virus. The disease, which was first identified in Italy more than 100 years ago, occurs worldwide. Avian influenza viruses are mainly distributed by migratory birds. Various animals like birds, pigs, horses, sea mammals and, finally, humans are susceptible to influenza A viruses. The high possibility of genomic changes like gene shift and drift are caused by the segmented RNA genome.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology
Between December 2003 and January 2004 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 infections of poultry were declared in China, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. In 2004 an outbreak was reported in Malaysia. In 2005 H5N1 outbreaks were recorded in poultry in Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, and virus was isolated from swans in Croatia. In 2004 HPAI H5N1 virus was isolated from smuggled eagles detected at the Brussels Airport and in 2005 imported caged birds held in quarantine in England. In 2006 HPAI was reported in poultry in Iraq, India, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Israel in Asia; Albania, France, and Sweden in Europe; and Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger in Africa; as well as in wild birds in some 24 countries across Asia and Europe. In 2003, over 25,000,000 birds were slaughtered because of 241 outbreaks of HPAI caused by virus of H7N7 subtype in the Netherlands. The virus spread into Belgium (eight outbreaks) and Germany (one outbreak). HPAI H5N2 virus was responsible for outbreaks in ostriches in South Africa during 2005. HPAI H7N3 virus was isolated in Pakistan in 2004. Low-pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) H5 or H7 viruses were isolated from poultry in Italy (H7N3 2002-2003; H5N2 2005), The Netherlands (H7N3 2002), France (H5N2 2003), Denmark (H5N7 2003), Taiwan (H5N2 2004), and Japan (H5N2 2005). Many isolations of LPAI viruses of other subtypes were reported from domestic and wild birds. Infections with H9N2 subtype viruses have been widespread across Asia during 2002-06.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology*
Avian influenza virus (AIV) H9N2 subtype is endemic in Iran and causes substantial economic loss to the growing poultry industry within the country. In this study, a cross-sectional analysis was carried out to determine the sero-prevalence of H9N2 in several commercial farms between the years 2014 and 2015. The comparison of the mean of serum titers and the ratio of sero-positive birds between all units were analyzed using one-way ANOVA test. In 2014, a total of 77 farms (58 turkey farms, 14 quail farms, and 5 partridge farms) and 894 birds (682 turkeys, 154 quails, and 58 partridges) were sampled while in 2015, a total of 69 farms (54 turkey farms, 8 quail farms, and 7 partridge farms) and 856 birds (675 turkeys, 105 quails, and 76 partridges) were sampled. Of that, 52 of 77 sampled farms (67.5%) and 437 of 894 samples (48.9%) were positive for H9N2 in 2014 while. Forty-one of 69 farms (59.4%) and 307 of 856 sera (35.9%) were positive in 2015. Furthermore, the mean titer of partridge farms was significantly lower than that of turkey farms (p 0.05). Our results indicated that H9N2 is circulating in these farms. Since many more such farms are being established for operations, in addition to the threat of emergence and continuous reemergence of the disease in these farms, enhanced veterinary biosecurity measures on farms are required for mitigation.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology*
The transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus to Southeast Asian countries triggered the first major outbreak and transmission wave in late 2003, accelerating the pandemic threat to the world. Due to the lack of influenza surveillance prior to these outbreaks, the genetic diversity and the transmission pathways of H5N1 viruses from this period remain undefined. To determine the possible source of the wave 1 H5N1 viruses, we recently conducted further sequencing and analysis of samples collected in live-poultry markets from Guangdong, Hunan, and Yunnan in southern China from 2001 to 2004. Phylogenetic analysis of the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of 73 H5N1 isolates from this period revealed a greater genetic diversity in southern China than previously reported. Moreover, results show that eight viruses isolated from Yunnan in 2002 and 2003 were most closely related to the clade 1 virus sublineage from Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia, while two viruses from Hunan in 2002 and 2003 were most closely related to viruses from Indonesia (clade 2.1). Further phylogenetic analyses of the six internal genes showed that all 10 of those viruses maintained similar phylogenetic relationships as the surface genes. The 10 progenitor viruses were genotype Z and shared high similarity (>/=99%) with their corresponding descendant viruses in most gene segments. These results suggest a direct transmission link for H5N1 viruses between Yunnan and Vietnam and also between Hunan and Indonesia during 2002 and 2003. Poultry trade may be responsible for virus introduction to Vietnam, while the transmission route from Hunan to Indonesia remains unclear.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology
Avian influenza viruses are highly infectious micro-organisms that primarily affect birds. Nevertheless, they have also been isolated from a number of mammals, including humans. Avian influenza virus can cause large economic losses to the poultry industry because of its high mortality. Although there are pathogenic variants with a low virulence and which generally cause only mild, if any, clinical symptoms, the subtypes H5 and H7 can mutate from a low to a highly virulent (pathogenic) virus and should be taken into consideration in eradication strategies. The primary source of infection for commercial poultry is direct and indirect contact with wild birds, with waterfowl forming a natural reservoir of the virus. Live-poultry markets, exotic birds, and ostriches also play a significant role in the epidemiology of avian influenza. The secondary transmission (i.e., between poultry farms) of avian influenza virus is attributed primarily to fomites and people. Airborne transmission is also important, and the virus can be spread by aerosol in humans. Diagnostic tests detect viral proteins and genes. Virus-specific antibodies can be traced by serological tests, with virus isolation and identification being complementary procedures. The number of outbreaks of avian influenza seems to be increasing - over the last 5 years outbreaks have been reported in Italy, Hong Kong, Chile, the Netherlands, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, China, Pakistan, United States of America, Canada, South Africa, and Malaysia. Moreover, a growing number of human cases of avian influenza, in some cases fatal, have paralleled the outbreaks in commercial poultry. There is great concern about the possibility that a new virus subtype with pandemic potential could emerge from these outbreaks. From the perspective of human health, it is essential to eradicate the virus from poultry; however, the large number of small-holdings with poultry, the lack of control experience and resources, and the international scale of transmission and infection make rapid control and long-term prevention of recurrence extremely difficult. In the Western world, the renewed interest in free-range housing carries a threat for future outbreaks. The growing ethical objections to the largescale culling of birds require a different approach to the eradication of avian influenza.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology
Numerous lessons have been learned so far in controlling H5N1 avian influenza in Asia. Early detection of incursions of virus prevented establishment of the disease in several countries, notably Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia. In countries where detection of early cases was delayed, infection is endemic and has been for three or more years. Control measures implemented in these countries need to reflect this finding. Vaccination will continue to be one of the key measures used in these endemically infected countries. Used alone, vaccination will not result in elimination of H5N1 viruses from a country, but, if used correctly, it will markedly reduce the prevalence of and susceptibility to infection. Vaccination has already played a valuable role in reducing the adverse effects of H5N1 viruses. Mass culling also reduces the level of infection in infected areas. However, the long-term benefits are limited in endemically infected countries owing to the high probability of reinfection on restocking unless other measures are used in parallel. Full epidemiological studies have not been conducted in many infected countries. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the number of clinical cases does not truly reflect the levels of infection. Domestic ducks and large live poultry markets have played a key role in the persistence of infection, because they can be infected silently. In tackling this disease, countries should adopt integrated control programs using the combination of measures best suited to the local environment. All surveillance data should be shared, both positive and negative, and should include information on cases of infection and disease. Socioeconomic and ecological implications of all control measures should be assessed before implementation, especially the impact on the rural poor.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology*
Vaccination is becoming a more acceptable option in the effort to eradicate avian influenza viruses (AIV) from commercial poultry, especially in countries where AIV is endemic. The main concern surrounding this option has been the inability of the conventional serological tests to differentiate antibodies produced due to vaccination from antibodies produced in response to virus infection. In attempts to address this issue, at least six strategies have been formulated, aiming to differentiate infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA), namely (i) sentinel birds, (ii) subunit vaccine, (iii) heterologous neuraminidase (NA), (iv) nonstructural 1 (NS1) protein, (v) matrix 2 ectodomain (M2e) protein, and (vi) haemagglutinin subunit 2 (HA2) glycoprotein. This short review briefly discusses the strengths and limitations of these DIVA strategies, together with the feasibility and practicality of the options as a part of the surveillance program directed toward the eventual eradication of AIV from poultry in countries where highly pathogenic avian influenza is endemic.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology
The development of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses in poultry in Eurasia accompanied with the increase in human infection in 2006 suggests that the virus has not been effectively contained and that the pandemic threat persists. Updated virological and epidemiological findings from our market surveillance in southern China demonstrate that H5N1 influenza viruses continued to be panzootic in different types of poultry. Genetic and antigenic analyses revealed the emergence and predominance of a previously uncharacterized H5N1 virus sublineage (Fujian-like) in poultry since late 2005. Viruses from this sublineage gradually replaced those multiple regional distinct sublineages and caused recent human infection in China. These viruses have already transmitted to Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand, resulting in a new transmission and outbreak wave in Southeast Asia. Serological studies suggest that H5N1 seroconversion in market poultry is low and that vaccination may have facilitated the selection of the Fujian-like sublineage. The predominance of this virus over a large geographical region within a short period directly challenges current disease control measures.
Matched MeSH terms: Influenza in Birds/epidemiology