METHODS: This study employs a rigorous gap analysis to measure the size of the illicit cigarette trade in Malaysia and compare it with the industry estimates.
FINDINGS: We found that in 2019, the illicit cigarette market share ranged from 38.2% to 52.5%, depending on assumptions with respect to consumption under-reporting, which is substantially less than the industry estimates. We found that the size of the illicit cigarette market was not driven by higher excise tax: doubling the excise tax rate from RM0.20 to RM0.40 per stick in November 2015 resulted in only a slight increase in the illicit cigarette market share and no increase in the number of illicit cigarettes in the market.
CONCLUSIONS: Therefore, a reduction in cigarette excise taxes, as suggested by the industry, will not solve the problem of illicit cigarette trade in Malaysia. Instead, the government should ratify the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control's Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and implement the strategies outlined in the protocol.
DESIGN: Primary and secondary documentary sources in both English and Malay were analysed to illuminate key events and decisions, and the discourse of industry and government. Sources included: speeches by Malaysian political and industry actors; tobacco industry reports, press releases and websites; government documents; World Health Organization (WHO) tobacco control literature; and press reports.
RESULTS: Malays have the highest smoking prevalence among Malaysia's major ethnic groups. The tobacco industry has consistently been promoted as furthering Malay economic development. Malays play the major role in growing and curing. Government-owned Malay development trusts have been prominent investors in tobacco corporations, which have cultivated linkages with the Malay elite. The religious element of Malay ethnicity has also been significant. All Malays are Muslim, and the National Fatwa Council has declared smoking to be haram (forbidden); however, the Government has declined to implement this ruling.
CONCLUSION: Exaggerated claims for the socio-economic benefits of tobacco production, government investment and close links between tobacco corporations and sections of the Malay elite have created a conflict of interest in public policy, limited the focus on tobacco as a health policy issue among Malays and retarded tobacco control policy. More recently, ratification of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, regional free trade policies reducing the numbers of growers, concerns about smoking from an Islamic viewpoint, and anxieties about the effects of smoking upon youth have increasingly challenged the dominant discourse that tobacco furthers Malay interests. Nevertheless, the industry remains a formidable political and economic presence in Malaysia that is likely to continue to proclaim that its activities coincide with Malay socio-economic interests.